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EMPLOYMENT LAW
By Eric J. Wallach
Businesses Fear C se May Bring
Courts Into Partnership Matters
THE CEL BRATED Hopkins v.
Price Waterhouse case produced
another momentous decision re¬
cently when the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia ruled that
Price Waterhouse had discriminated
against Anne Hopkins because of her
sex in denyin  her partnership status
and ordered the accountin  fir  to re¬
instate her, as a partner, effective Jul 
1,1990.' The holding by Judge Gerhard
Gesell sent shock waves throu h the
professional and business communi¬
ties. It is one of the first court-mandat¬
ed reinstatement decisions that goes
beyond mere continuation of employ¬
ment or even enforced p omotion of an
e ployee.
Judge Gesell s ruling potentially
opens the door for judicial intervention
in the up-to-now hi hl  subjective and
largely unre ulated field of partner¬
ship and senior executive decisions.
What remains to be seen is whether
this rulin  au urs a new era of in¬
creased re ulation of em loyment de¬
cisions, or whether it is an aberration
the product of the combination of an
insensitive employer, a sympathetic
plaintif  and an activist  ud e.
Ms. Hopkins had been workin  as a
senior manager at Price Waterhouse s
Washington, D.C., office for approxi¬
mately five years wljen she first came
up for partnership consideration in
1982. She was the only female amon 
88 candidates for partnership that
year. Exceptional in her job-related ac¬
complishments, she was described by
colleagues as "an outstandin  profes¬
sional" and as "extremel  competent,
intelligent."1 In addition, Ms. Hopkins
had distinguished herself from other
candidates for partnership by her re¬
arkable success in producin  new
busine s for her firm.
Yet Anne Hopkins was not elected a
partner at Price Waterhouse. Certain
partners evaluating her claimed that
she was difficult to  et alon  with and
especially short-tem ered with the
staff. These otherwise facially valid
criticisms took on another tone, howev¬
er, when the commentin  partners also
cha acterized M . Hopkins as too "ma¬
cho" and needing a course in charm
school. A key partne  in Ms. Hopkins’
office at Price Waterhouse advised her
to "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry."1
AFTER definitively bein  denied
partnership in 1983, Ms. Hopkins
resigned. Sh  then commence 
an action a ainst Price Waterhouse,
allegin  sex discrimination in viola¬
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,  Judge Gesell determined at
the ori inal trial that Price Water¬
house's partnership decision was in¬
deed tainted by im e missible sexual
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stereotypin , and that under Title VII,
Ms. Hopkins was entitled to monetary
relief.5 The cou t declined, however, to
order that Ms. Hopkins be reinstated at
Price Waterhouse because it found
that the record did not sufficiently sup¬
port her assertion that the denial of
partnership status was tantamount to
a constructive dischar e.*
The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia affirme 
Judge GeselPs finding that i permis¬
sible sexual ste eotyping played a si ¬
nificant, negative role in Ms. Hopkins'
bid for partnership. The D.C. Circuit
went further, however, by reversing
the trial court on the constructive dis¬
charge issue. Specifically, it held that
"Price Waterhouse's decision to deny
Hopkins  artnership status.. .coupled
with (her department’s] failure to re¬
nominate her, would have been viewed
b  any reasonable senior manager in
her position as a ca eer-ending
action."7
The U.S. Supreme Court  ranted cer¬
tiorari, and a majority affirmed the
findin s of the lower courts with re¬
spect to the discriminatory taint in¬
volved in Price Waterhouse's consid¬
eration of Ms. Hopkins' partne ship
candidacy. In a dition, the court made
an important procedural determina¬
tion. It ruled that once, as in this case,
the plaintiff shows that a discrimina¬
tory reason plays a motivating part in
an employment decision, the burden
shifts to the employer to show that It
would have made the same decision
even if it had not allowed the ille iti¬
mate motive to play a role.' The case
was remanded to the trial court for
determination unde  this relaxed stan¬
ard of proof applicable to plaintiffs
such as Ms. Hopkins.
On remand, Ju ge Gesell Issued his
reinstatement order.  It should be re¬
called that Title VII ex licitly provides
for reinstatement as a remedy for em¬
lo ment discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex or national or¬
igin. The statute recites, in relevant
part, that
[t]f the court finds that the respon¬
dent has intentionally engaged or
is intentionally engaging in an un¬
la ful employment practice...the
court may enjoin the respondent
from enga ing in such unlawful
employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include,
but is not limited to, reinstatement
or hiring of employees.. .or any
other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate.'*
The Supreme Court expressly con¬
firmed judicial authority to order rein¬
statement with constructive or full
seniority as relief for victims of dis¬
crimination in Franks u. Bowman
Tran portation Co." and Albemarle Pa¬
p r Co. v. Mood .'* Indeed, reinstate¬
ment historically was established
before the enactment of Title VII as a
remedy for discriminatory employ¬
ment practices. In an early Supreme
Court employment discrimination
case involvin  the discharge of work¬
ers for their union activities, Justice
Felix Frankfurter stated that "(rjein-
statement is the conventional correc¬
tion for discriminatory discharges."11
In the context of equal e ployment
opportunity, the ar ument for the ap¬
propriateness of reinstatement as a
remedy becomes even more compel¬
ling, given the objective of Title VII to
compensate for the harmful effects of
ast discrimination. Cases in this area
routinely reiterate the language of
F anks and Albemarle Paper that
courts must strive to grant "the most
complete relief possible" for Title VII
violations, emphasizing that the vic¬
tim must be made "whole" by being
placed   as closely as possible   in
the situation he or she would have oc¬
cupied but for the discriminatory acts.
Yet in distinct counterpoint to the
reasoning that would "make whole 
the victim of unlawful discrimination
lies the histo ical reluctance of courts
specifically to enforce personal service
contracts." Like the paradigmatic con¬
tract dispute in which the court  ould
not force the soprano to perform
against her wishes,'5 courts often shy
away from compelling an employment
situation that would force together un¬
willing participants.
It is the tension between these com¬
peting principles   the desi e to put
victims of discrimination into the posi¬
tion they would have occupied but for
the unlawful acts, and the reluctance
to mandate an unwanted em loyment
relation   that shapes the history of
the reinstatement remedy, an  its rela¬
tively Infrequent use, in Title VII liti¬
ation.
COURTS THAT have declined to
rant reinstatement in Title VII
cases have cited the traditional
ar ument against compellin  the con¬
tinuation of an employment situation
that has become intolerable to one or
both parties, because it lacks the mutu¬
al trust and confidence required in
such a relation.
The U.S. District Court for the South¬
ern District of New York in EEOC u.
Kallir, Philips, Ross Inc.'* used precise¬
ly this reasoning to deny reinstate¬
ment to a high-level advertisin  execu¬
tive who had been discharged from her
firm in retaliation for filing a sex dis¬
crimination char e a ainst it. The de¬
cision emphasized the hostile and
confrontational relationship that ex¬
isted between the two parties. The
court stated that in employment situa¬
tions that require a close workin  rela¬
tionship bet een the Title VII plaintiff
and the'top executives of the defendant
firm, a lack of complete trust and con¬
fidence "could lead to misunderstand¬
ings, misrepresentations and mis¬
takes, and could seriously damage
defendant’s relationshi  with its cli¬
ents."
The same result has occurred in oth¬
e , similar cases. Courts have conclud¬
ed that reinstatement of a hi h-level
employee was precluded because of
the estrangement of the plaintiff from
the employer," and found that the level
of bitterness and antagonism existin 
between employee and employer man¬
dated alternative forms of relief."
The question remains, then, as to the
circumstances that prompted Ju ge
Gesell to order Ms. Ho kins s rein¬
statement. There was ample evidence
in the record concerning the accumu¬
lated hostility between the Price Wa¬
terhouse partners and Ms. Hopkins. By
no stretch of the imagination could a
court have expected that Price Water-
house would welcome Ms. Hopkins
warmly or enthusiastically to the part¬
nership. Judge Gesell acknowledged
his awareness of these considerations
and noted that the specter of work¬
place antagonism is a relevant factor
in weighing the appropriateness of re¬
instatement."
The court did not adopt this reason¬
in , however, in reaching its conclu¬
sion. Instead, Judge Gesell analyzed a
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variety of other important elements,
focusing on the character of Price Wa¬
terhouse. He portrayed the fi m as an
entity that, although nominally func¬
tioning as   partnership, was more ac¬
curately described as a "national
concern [that] lacks the intimacy and
interdependence of smaller partner¬
ships." The court emphasized the size
(approximately 900 partners in 90 of¬
fices) and structure (no ceilin  placed
on the number of partners) of the fi m
in de ictin  Price Waterhouse not as a
ti ht-knit partnership whose delicate
balance of cooperation and collegiality
would be upset b  the imposition of an
unwanted partner, but instead as an
immense, impersonal outpost of corpo¬
rate America.
This aspect of Ju ge Gesell s analy¬
sis, while perhaps unique in its appli¬
cation,. is not without precedent. The
rationale for reinstatement as a reme-
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dy has long been re arded as more ap¬
plicable to job cate ories involvin 
impersonal or routine responsibili¬
ties,M as o posed to highly Influential,
decision-making positions in which the
reinstatement of an antagonistic or
disliked employee could have pro¬
foundly divisive results. Courts them¬
selves have drawn such a distinction.
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the court  artially supported its deni l
of reinstatement on the basis of this
rationale:  The situation here is quite
unlike that presented when reinstate¬
ment is sought for an assembly line or
clerical  orker, or even for an execu¬
tive whose job is not as sensitive for
his employer's interests as is plaintiff's
job here." 
Beyond focusing on the perceived
impersonality of Price Waterhouse,
Judge Geseil also predicated the ap¬
prop iateness of reinstatement on a se¬
ries of factors that may be instructive
in other pros ective situations. To be¬
gin with, the court stated the proposi¬
tion that reinstatement was "always
(Ms. Hopkins'] objective" in the litiga¬
tion. Implicit in this reasonin  is the
notion that in Ms. Hopkins  field, there
mi ht have been no adequa e substi¬
tute for a partnership wi h as presti¬
ious and prominent a firm as Price
Waterhouse.
In addition, Judge Geseil com ent¬
ed on the specul tive nature of the al¬
ternative of front pay, which might
confer  a  holly unwarranted wind¬
f ll" on Ms. Hopkins (or, for that mat¬
ter, on Price Waterhouse). Thus, he
stressed the impossibility of pre ictin 
with any certainty the likelihood or de¬
gree of financial or professional suc¬
cess that Ms. Hop ins (or Price Water-
house) might enjoy in the years ahead.
Finally, and tellingly, the court em¬
phasized its doubt "as to whether mon¬
etary relief alone provides a sufficient
deterrent against future discrimina¬
tion for a  rou  o  hi hly-paid part¬
ners." Judge Geseil commented on the
apparent futility of merely havin 
Price Waterhouse take "a new vote" on
Ms. Hopkins' partnership candidacy,
and s ecifically en oined Price Water-
house from retaliating against Ms.
Hopkins upon her admissio  to the
partnership.
IT SHOU D BE stressed that Judge
Geseil characterized his reinstate¬
ment order as flowin  naturally
from the U.S. Supreme Court s 1984 de¬
cision in JftofroH u. King d Spalding. 
That case established the predicate
proposition that, within the context of
professional partnerships, partnership
dmissio  decisions are amon  the
terms, conditions or privileges of em¬
ployment and thus come within the
reach of Title VII.
That principle havi   been settled,
ud e Geseil concl ded that "there is
no lo ical reason that the full r nge of
Title VII remedies aimed at makin 
the cl imant whole are not appropri¬
ate." In reachin  this result, the court
dismissed as I relevant the fact that in
Hi-sJioii, the plaintiff was not seekin ,
and did not obtain, reinstatement.
In this re ard, Jud e Geseil correct¬
ly gauged the seminal impact of the
decision in Hi hon in expandin  the
reach of Title VII to a variety of hybrid
and formerly unre ulated employment
relationships. Thus, for instance, in
Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Asso¬
ciate  P.C., the 2d Circuit, citin  the
rule in Hi hon, ruled that the employer
could not avoid the employment dis¬
crimination laws merely by character¬
izing Us employees as partners or
shareholders In the concern.”
To the same effect, in Mozee v. Jeff-
boat Inc., the 7th Circuit decided on the
basis of Hi hon that a promotion that
would place the plaintiff outside of the
protecte  e ployee class does not Im¬
munize the promotion from Title VII
scrutiny.1' Similarly  oteworthy is the
holding by the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida in Scn-
ncllo v.  eserve Life I  urance Co. that,
in accordance with the logic of Hi hon,
an employee cannot evade Title VII li¬
ability by using the ex edient of de¬
motin  employees to unprotected sta-
Continued on following page
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tus shortly before firing them.**
Although not cited by Judge Gesell
in his opinion, the recent U.S. Supreme
Court holding in t/niuer.sify of Pennsyl¬
vania v. EEOC  contributes to the con¬
text in which Hopkins v. Price Wa¬
terhouse was decided. That case in¬
volved a claim by a female faculty
member that she had been discrimi¬
nated against on account of sex in re¬
ard to the decision b  the Wharton
School of Business denying her tenure.
The c se reached the Supreme Court
on the issue of whether the university
could be compelled to disclose confi¬
dential  eer review materials used in
the deci ion-makin  process. The Su¬
preme Court ruled that a showing of
mere relevance,  s opposed to a judi¬
cia  findin  of " articularized necessi¬
ty of access," sufficed to requi e dis-
ciosurc of the documents in question.
Writing for the court, Justice Harry
Biackmun made it plain that he
vie ed the decision as one of  eneral
pplication. Assumin , for instance,
that  confidential peer reviews pla  an
important part in partnership determi¬
nations at some law firms," Justice
Biackmun professed himself unable to
discern a  limitin  principle  in the
University of Pennsylvania s position.
He clearly prescribed that all such ma¬
terials and deliberations were proper
subjects of discovery in Title VII pro¬
ceedings. At least by implication, the
Supreme Court was availing plaintiffs
of the practical means to exercise the
ri hts define  in cases such as Hishon.
he critical issue is assessin  the
prospective impact of Judge Gesell’s
reinstatement order. At a minimum,
this decision changes the rules of the
game by increasing to some degree the
exposure of defendant e ployers and
The court portrayed the
firm as a huge business
entity that was closer
to a  national concern 
than to a partnership.
addin  a now and credible weapon to'
the arsenal of the plaintiffs' bar.
ON BALANCE, however, it seems
highly unli ely that courts  ill
fix upon reinstatement as the
reme y of choice in discrimination
cases or that business and the profes¬
sions will face a tidal wave of court-
ordered  einstatement decisions. The
mo e probable and well-advised out¬
come is that Hopkins v. Price Water-
hou e will be narrowly construed on
the basis of its unique fact pattern and
that it will represent the exceptio 
rather than the  ule  ith regard to ap¬
pro riate remedies in Title VI I and
other equal employ ent opportunit 
lawsuits.
Several important factors militate in
favor of this conclusion. First, the
court expressly acknowledged that the
specter of extreme  orkplace hostility
remains a key issue to be weighed in
futu e cases in assessing the propriety
of reinstatement. As in the past, this
part of the equation may well continue
to be outcome-deter inative in most
proceedings. In other words, courts are
likel  to remain reluctant to impose
employees on unwilling employers.
Second, Judge Gesell explicitl  dis¬
tinguished the myriad situations im¬
plicating "the intimacy and interde¬
pendence of smaller partnerships 
from the  atter at hand. Presumably,
the s me distinction would apply in
business contexts in which the rein¬
statement issue affected an executive
or policy-making position.
Third, Judge Gesell rationalized in
part the intrusion on Price Water¬
house's Internal affai s based on his
conviction that, given the company's
size, scope and character, Ms. Hopkins
would not have "significant influence"
on the firm as a ne  partner.  here is
no reason to believe that the same re¬
sult woul  occur in circumstances i 
which this element was absent or even
in doubt.
Finally, the court's determination
that reinstatement was a better deter¬
rent toff unlawful discrimination than a
front-pay a ard is, at best, a hi hly
controversial thesis. Other t ibunals
ight well conclude that money dam¬
ages convey a sharper message to the
offending employer (and to other simi¬
larly situated employers) than the
court-ordered reinstatement of an os¬
tensibl  qualified, albeit unwanted,
e ployee.
Even by its own terms, the reinstate¬
ment decision in Hopkin  v. Price Wa¬
terhou e does not chan e the tradition¬
al disinclination of courts to interfere
with the financial or commercial af¬
fairs or the  overnance of businesses
and professional firms. Instead, it ap¬
pears to reflect the simple determina¬
tion that, given the extreme
circumstances of this particular case,
a lar e concern such as Price Water-
hou e could tolerate without undue dif¬
ficulty or disharmony the addition of
Ms. Hopkins to the partnership.
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